

1                    ENCRYPTION KEY FOR MULTI-KEY ENCRYPTION IN  
2                    PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC DEVICE

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7    FIELD OF THE INVENTION

8            The invention relates to PLDs, more particularly to protection of designs  
9    loaded into a PLD through a bitstream.  
10

11   BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

12            A PLD (programmable logic device) is an integrated circuit structure that  
13   performs digital logic functions selected by a designer. PLDs include logic blocks  
14   and interconnect lines and typically both the logic blocks and interconnections are  
15   programmable. One common type of PLD is an FPGA (field programmable logic  
16   device), in which the logic blocks typically include lookup tables and flip flops,  
17   and can typically generate and store any function of their input signals. Another  
18   type is the CPLD (complex programmable logic device) in which the logic blocks  
19   perform the AND function and the OR function and the selection of input signals  
20   is programmable.  
21

22   Problem with storing bitstream external to PLD

23            Designs implemented in PLDs have become complex, and it often takes  
24   months to complete and debug a design to be implemented in a PLD. When the  
25   design is going into a system of which the PLD is a part and is to be sold for profit,  
26   the designer does not want the result of this design effort to be copied by someone  
27   else. The designer often wants to keep the design a trade secret. Many PLDs,  
28   particularly FPGAs, use volatile configuration memory that must be loaded from  
29   an external device such as a PROM every time the PLD is powered up. Since  
30   configuration data is stored external to the PLD and must be transmitted through  
31   a configuration access port, the privacy of the design can easily be violated by an

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1 attacker who monitors the data on the configuration access port, e.g. by putting  
2 probes on board traces.

3  
4 Current solutions and their disadvantages

5       Efforts have been made to encrypt designs, but it is difficult to make the  
6 design both secure from attackers and easy to use by legitimate users. The  
7 encryption algorithm is not a problem. Several encryption algorithms, for  
8 example, the standard Data Encryption Standard (DES) and the more secure  
9 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm, are known for encrypting blocks  
10 of data. The process of cipher block chaining (CBC), in which an unencrypted  
11 data word is XORed with the next encrypted data word before decryption allows  
12 the DES or AES to encrypt a serial stream of data and these are therefore  
13 appropriate for encrypting a bitstream for configuring a PLD. A key used for  
14 encrypting the design must somehow be communicated in a secure way between  
15 the PLD and the structure that decrypts the design, so the design can be decrypted  
16 by the PLD before being used to configure the PLD. Then, once the PLD has been  
17 configured using the unencrypted design, the design must continue to be  
18 protected from unauthorized discovery.

19       A November 24, 1997 publication by Peter Alfke of Xilinx, Inc. entitled  
20 "Configuration Issues: Power-up, Volatility, Security, Battery Back-up" describes  
21 several steps that can be taken to protect a design in an existing FPGA device  
22 having no particular architectural features within the FPGA to protect the design.  
23 Loading design configuration data into the FPGA and then removing the source of  
24 the configuration data but using a battery to maintain continuous power to the  
25 FPGA while holding the FPGA in a standby non-operational mode is one method.  
26 However, power requirements on the battery make this method impractical for  
27 large FPGA devices.

28       Nonvolatile configuration memory is another possibility. If the design is  
29 loaded at the factory before the device is sold, it is difficult for a purchaser of the  
30 configured PLD device to determine what the design is. However, a reverse

1 engineering process in which the programmed device is decapped, metal layers  
2 are removed, and the nonvolatile memory cells are chemically treated can expose  
3 which memory cells have been charged and thus can allow an attacker to learn the  
4 design. Further, nonvolatile memory requires a more complex and more  
5 expensive process technology than standard CMOS process technology, and takes  
6 longer to bring to market.

7 It is also known to store a decryption key in nonvolatile memory in a PLD,  
8 load an encrypted bitstream into the PLD and decrypt the bitstream using the key  
9 within the PLD. This prevents an attacker from reading the bitstream as it is being  
10 loaded into the PLD, and does retain the key when power is removed from the  
11 PLD. Such an arrangement is described by Austin in U.S. Patent 5,388,157. But  
12 this structure does not protect the user's design from all modes of attack.

13 In addition to design protection, some users need data protection. They may  
14 have generated data within the PLD that should not be lost when the PLD loses  
15 power. It is desirable to protect such data.

16 There remains a need for a design protection method that is convenient,  
17 reliable, and secure.

## 18 19 SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

20 The invention provides several structures and methods for protecting a PLD  
21 from unauthorized use and data loss.

22 If the PLD is configured by static RAM memory that must be loaded on  
23 power-up, the configuration data must be protected as it is being loaded into the  
24 device. As in the prior art, this is accomplished by encrypting the configuration  
25 data for storing it in a memory outside the integrated circuit device, loading one  
26 or more decryption keys into the PLD and maintaining the keys in the PLD when  
27 powered down, including a decryption circuit within the PLD that uses the key to  
28 decrypt the configuration data, generating decrypted configuration data within  
29 the PLD and configuring the PLD using the decrypted configuration data.

1 For additional security, rather than using nonvolatile memory to preserve  
2 keys, the invention preferably uses a battery connected to the PLD to preserve the  
3 key when power is removed from the PLD. Whereas it is possible to remove a  
4 PLD storing keys in nonvolatile memory, decap the PLD and observe which of the  
5 nonvolatile bits are programmed to logic 1 and which are programmed to logic 0,  
6 it is believed that it is very difficult to determine the contents of keys stored only  
7 in static memory cells since power must be maintained to the memory cells storing  
8 the keys in order for the keys to even be stored, and the PLD would have to be  
9 decapped, delayed, and probed while operating power is continuous to the  
10 PLD.

11  
12 Ways an attacker can steal a design once loaded into a PLD

13 If a key does not offer sufficient security, an attacker may break the  
14 encryption code and determine the value of the key. The well-known Data  
15 Encryption Standard DES used a 56-bit encryption key, and has been broken in a  
16 few hours by a sophisticated computer to reveal the key. DES is described by  
17 Bruce Schneier in "Applied Cryptography Second Edition: protocols, algorithms,  
18 and source code in C" copyright 1996 by Bruce Schneier, published by John Wiley  
19 & Sons, Inc., at pages 265-278. If it is desirable to use such a well known  
20 encryption standard, then in order to increase security, the configuration data may  
21 be encrypted several times using different keys each time, thus strengthening the  
22 encryption code by about  $2^{56}$  each time the encryption is repeated. Or it may be  
23 encrypted using a first key, decrypted using a second key, and encrypted using a  
24 third key, a combination that is part of the triple DES standard. Other encryption  
25 algorithms may also be used, and it is not necessary to keep the algorithm secret  
26 since the security resides in the key. When the encryption method is symmetrical,  
27 the same keys used for encryption are stored in the PLD and used in reverse order  
28 for decryption.

29 In a PLD offering multiple keys, if the number of keys to be used and the  
30 addresses of all keys were provided in an unencrypted bitstream, an attacker

1 might be able to attack the keys one at a time and more easily determine the key  
2 values. To avoid such attack, additional security is achieved by storing within the  
3 keys, not the bitstream, an indication of how many keys are to be used and  
4 whether a key is the last key of a set or whether more are to follow.

5 If the PLD offers the option of reading back the bitstream after it has been  
6 loaded into the PLD, another method that can be used by an attacker is to read  
7 back this bitstream. To avoid this method of attacking the design, in one  
8 embodiment, a PLD that offers readback and also offers encryption includes the  
9 ability to disable the readback feature when encryption has been used. In another  
10 embodiment, the PLD that offers the ability to read back encrypts the  
11 configuration data before it is read back.

12 Additionally, some PLDs offer the option of partial configuration (where  
13 several configuration addresses are specified for loading several portions of a  
14 design) and partial reconfiguration (where an existing design is not erased before  
15 new design data are loaded). If the PLD offers these options, an attacker could  
16 partially reconfigure a PLD to make successive portions of the design visible, and  
17 probably learn the whole design. To avoid such an attack, in one embodiment,  
18 partial configuration and reconfiguration of PLDs loaded with encrypted designs  
19 are disallowed. In another embodiment, several configuration addresses can be  
20 specified, but the addresses are encrypted.

21 Yet another mode of attack is to try to flip a bit that indicates the security  
22 status of the PLD. Lowering or raising the operating voltage, changing the  
23 temperature, and applying noise to certain ports come to mind. To protect against  
24 such bit-flipping, when the PLD is operating with a secured bitstream, a secure-  
25 mode flag is set, and in one embodiment, if this flag becomes unset, all  
26 configuration data is erased. In another embodiment that doesn't allow for  
27 reconfiguration while the device is still operating, the configuration data is erased  
28 before any bitstream is sent.

29 Another mode of attack is to relocate portions of the encrypted bitstream so  
30 that when they are unencrypted they are placed into visible portions of the PLD

1 not intended by the designer. To prevent this relocation, address information is  
2 used in the encryption and decryption processes so that sending a portion of an  
3 encrypted bitstream to a different PLD location from that intended by the designer  
4 will cause it to decrypt differently into data with no meaning. Cipher block  
5 chaining (CBC) is one effective means of achieving this result. In cipher block  
6 chaining, the decrypted data packet (block) is combined using the XOR function  
7 with the next data block before the next block is decrypted, thus the encrypted  
8 data for each data block depends on every block that preceded it and on the order  
9 of those blocks. Identical blocks of data will encrypt to different values depending  
10 on the value of the data blocks that preceded them. This way, if the order of the  
11 blocks is changed, the bitstream will not decrypt correctly because the place where  
12 the encrypted bitstream is rearranged will scramble subsequent data. Further, the  
13 initial CBC value can be modified to incorporate the address of the data to force  
14 the decrypted data to be placed at a specific location in order to decrypt correctly.

15       Alternatively, if the PLD allowed part of a design to be encrypted and part to  
16 be unencrypted, the attacker could add an unencrypted portion to the encrypted  
17 portion that would read out information about the encrypted portion of the  
18 design. Thus, additional security is achieved by permitting the design to be totally  
19 encrypted or totally unencrypted, but not to be mixed. Further to this, in one  
20 embodiment, when data are being encrypted, additional security is provided by  
21 allowing only a single full-chip configuration following a single starting address  
22 for the configuration data.

23       Further, in order to allow convenient testing and debugging and to allow the  
24 PLD manufacturer to communicate freely with its customers (the designers who  
25 produce the designs for configuring the PLD), the PLD has both encrypted and  
26 unencrypted modes of operating, and when operating in the encrypted mode,  
27 parts of the configuration bitstream that control loading of the configuration data  
28 into the PLD are still not encrypted.

29       As another mode of attack, if the PLD manufacturer gives information freely  
30 about the configuration bitstream format, including header information and

addresses for loading configuration data, and gives information about the encryption method used, encrypting this well known information would expose the encryption key to possible discovery. Such exposure is avoided by encrypting only the actual configuration data and leaving control information unencrypted.

If the PLD manufacturer allows the key memory to be used in both secure and non-secure modes, an attacker could simply learn the keys by placing the key memory into non-secure mode and reading out the keys. To avoid such attack, the PLD manufacturer includes a circuit that causes all keys plus any configuration data loaded into the PLD to be erased when the key memory is moved to non-secure mode.

#### BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Fig. 1 shows functional relationships in a prior art FPGA.

Fig. 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d show bitstream format and commands that can be included in a prior art bitstream.

Fig. 3 shows functional relationships in an FPGA according to one embodiment of the present invention.

Fig. 4a, 4b, 4c, and 4d show bitstream format and commands that can be included in a bitstream of the present invention.

Fig. 5a and 5b show example unencrypted and encrypted bitstreams.

Fig. 6 shows configuration logic 29 and the lines in bus 27 and bus 28 leading to decryptor 24.

Fig. 7a shows the modified starting value for outer cipher block chaining with triple encryption used in one embodiment of the invention.

Fig. 7b shows the corresponding starting value and decryption process used with Fig. 7a.

Fig. 8 shows flow of the operations for processing a bitstream.

Fig. 9 shows a state machine implemented by decryptor 24 to evaluate key order.

Fig. 10a shows the structure of key memory 23 of Fig. 3.

Fig. 10b shows the structure of the memory cells of Fig. 10a.

Fig. 11 shows the steps performed by control logic 23a of Fig. 10a to erase keys when made non-secure.

Fig. 12 shows in more detail the battery supply switch of Fig. 10a.

Figs. 13 and 14 show the level shift circuit and voltage detection circuit of the battery supply switch of Fig. 12.

Fig. 15 shows a state machine for erasing a design when a secure mode is exited.

Fig. 16 shows a block diagram of elements for loading configuration memory and reading back configuration, including lines disabled when encryption is present.

#### DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Fig. 1 shows a prior art structure for an FPGA 10. The FPGA includes programmable logic 11, typically comprising (1) logic blocks with lookup table combinatorial logic function generators, flip flops for storing lookup table outputs and other values, and multiplexers and logic gates for enhancing the logic ability of the programmable logic (2) routing lines and programmable interconnection points for routing signals around the FPGA, and (3) input/output blocks for driving signals between the routing lines and the external pins of the FPGA.

The FPGA also includes configuration memory 12 for turning on routing transistors, controlling multiplexers, storing lookup tables and controlling the input/output blocks, all of this for the purpose of configuring the FPGA to perform the function desired by the designer(s). Bus 16 connects configuration memory 12 to programmable logic 11 and is typically a distributed set of control lines located throughout the FPGA. Some Xilinx products (e.g. XC6200) have included a bus 17 by which programmable logic 11 causes configuration logic 14 to send programming information to configuration memory 12. Such a structure is described by Kean in U.S. Patent 5,705,938.



FPGA 10 further includes a JTAG logic block 13 for interfacing with JTAG port 20, especially intended for testing of the board in which the FPGA will be placed. JTAG logic block 13 implements the IEEE standard 1532, which is a superset of the IEEE standard 1149.1. JTAG allows debugging of a design at the board level.

Finally FPGA 10 includes configuration logic 14 for responding to a configuration bitstream from external source 15 on configuration access port 21 and for interfacing with JTAG logic block 13. The bitstream on configuration access port 21 is treated as words, in one embodiment 32-bit words. Several of the words, usually at or near the beginning of the bitstream, are used for setting up the configuration process and include, for example, length of a configuration memory frame, and starting address for the configuration data. Bus 19 allows communication between configuration logic 14 and JTAG logic block 13 so that the JTAG port can be used as another configuration access port. Bus 18 allows communication between configuration logic block 14 and configuration memory 12. In particular, it carries addresses to select configuration frames in memory 12, control signals to perform write and read operations, and data for loading into configuration memory 12 or reading back from configuration memory 12.

Configuration Logic block 14 receives instructions and data, and processes the data according to the instructions. These instructions come into configuration logic 14 as a bitstream. An instruction, or header, is usually followed by data to be acted upon. Fig. 2a shows an example bitstream structure. Header A specifies an action and specifies that a single word, Data A, will follow. Header B specifies an action and in this case specifies that 4 words of data will follow to be acted upon.

Fig. 2b shows the default format (format type 001) for a 32-bit header word in the bitstream used in the Virtex(R) devices available from Xilinx, Inc. (Virtex is a registered trademark of Xilinx, Inc., assignee of the present invention). This format includes three bits to indicate the format type (001), two bits to specify an op code, 16 bits for a configuration logic register address, and 11 bits for a word

count. The op code can designate a read operation, a write operation, or no operation. For example, 00 can designate no operation, 01 can designate read and 10 can designate write. The 11 bits for word count can specify  $2^{11}$  words or 2048 words. As shown in Fig. 2c, if the word count is greater than this, the word count bits in format type 001 are set to 00000000000 and the header of format type 001 is followed by a header of format type 2. Format type 2 uses 27 bits to specify word count, and can thus specify  $2^{27}$  words or 2.68 million words.

Fig. 2d shows the kinds of control information that can be loaded into the registers of Configuration Logic 14 by headers for a Virtex bitstream. For example, a header (of format 001) having the configuration logic register address 0000 specifies that the next 32-bit data word should be loaded into the cyclic redundancy check (CRC) register. (Virtex devices use a 16-bit cyclic redundancy check value so some bits will be padded with 0's.) If the header includes an address 0001, the next data will be loaded into the Frame Address register in order to specify a frame (column) in configuration memory 12 to receive or provide data.

The Configuration Logic Register address (16 bits) shown in Fig. 2b provides the 4-bit values shown in the left column of Fig. 2d that select one of the registers in configuration logic 14 (Fig. 1) into which to place the next 32-bit data word. The Frame Length register (address 1011) specifies the length of the frame into which the configuration data will be loaded. (Frame length, or column height, depends upon the size of the PLD. Larger PLDs usually have taller columns or longer frames. Specifying the frame length in the bitstream and storing the frame length in a register rather than providing a different structure in the PLD for placing the data words into frames allows the internal configuration logic to be identical for PLDs of different sizes.)

For readback, a read command is placed in the op code field and the Frame Data Output register is addressed, followed by a Word Count (using Command Header Format 2 if necessary). The specified number of words is read back from configuration memory 12, starting at the address specified in the Frame Address

1 register, and shifted out on either configuration access port 21 or JTAG port 20.  
2 (Readback data is returned to the port that issued the readback instruction) .

3 Specifying a word count in a bitstream header or pair of headers (Figs. 2b  
4 and 2c) sets a counter that counts down as the data words are loaded. For many  
5 configuration logic register addresses the word count is 1. But if the bitstream  
6 header has a configuration logic address of 0010 or 0011 to indicate configuration  
7 data are being loaded in or read back, the word count will be much larger. This is  
8 when header format 2 of Fig. 2c is used. Data loaded into configuration memory  
9 12 through the frame data input register (address 0010) or read out through the  
10 frame data output register (address 0011) is called the design data because it  
11 causes the FPGA to implement a design or shows the status of a design. The other  
12 register data are control data since they control how the configuration logic  
13 behaves while the logic is being configured or read back.

14 Further detail about configuration of Virtex devices can be found in the  
15 "Virtex Configuration Guide" published October 9, 2000 by Xilinx, Inc. (assignee  
16 of the present invention), 2100 Logic Drive, San Jose, CA 95124. This  
17 configuration guide is incorporated herein by reference.

18 Configuration logic 14 typically performs a cyclic redundancy check on a  
19 configuration bitstream coming in (see Erickson, U.S. Patent 5,321,704  
20 incorporated herein by reference, or see pages 39 through 40 of the above  
21 referenced Virtex Configuration Guide), reads header bits indicating the frame  
22 length of the part being configured and the word count of the configuration data,  
23 reads address instructions identifying where to load configuration data, collects  
24 frames of configuration data and loads them into columns of configuration  
25 memory 12 indicated in the addresses. Configuration logic 14 also controls  
26 readback of configuration data and flip flop values from configuration memory 12  
27 to an external location. In a Virtex FPGA available from Xilinx, Inc., readback can  
28 be done through either JTAG port 20 or through configuration access port 21.

29 Configuration logic 14 can also receive configuration data from  
30 programmable logic 11. More information about prior art FPGA structures in

1 which part of the FPGA configures another part of the FPGA can be found in  
2 Kean, U.S. Patent 5,705,938. More information about architectures of FPGAs  
3 similar to the Virtex architecture can be found in Young et al., U.S. Patent  
4 5,914,616. Both patents are incorporated herein by reference. The format of a  
5 bitstream used with the Virtex product available from Xilinx, Inc., assignee of the  
6 present invention, is described in an Application Note, XAPP138, entitled "Virtex  
7 FPGA Series Configuration and Readback" available from Xilinx, Inc., 2100 Logic  
8 Drive, San Jose, CA 95124 published Oct. 4, 2000.

9  
10 PLD with Decryption

11 Fig. 3 shows a block diagram of an FPGA (a type of PLD) according to one  
12 embodiment of the present invention. Some elements are the same as shown in  
13 Fig. 1, are given the same reference numbers, and not explained again. In  
14 addition, Fig. 3 includes an expanded configuration logic unit 29, a decryptor 24  
15 and a key memory 23. Fig. 3 shows an embodiment in which key memory 23 is  
16 loaded on bus 25 from JTAG access port 20. In other embodiments, key memory  
17 23 is loaded through another port. Bus 25 carries data, addresses, and control  
18 signals to perform write and read operations and allows programming of the  
19 decryption keys from JTAG port 20. In one embodiment, bus 26 allows  
20 programming of the keys from the configuration port. In another embodiment,  
21 bus 26 is eliminated. In yet another embodiment, bus 26 is present and bus 25 is  
22 eliminated. In an embodiment described further herein, bus 26 carries security  
23 data from key memory 23 to configuration logic 29. In one embodiment, bus 27  
24 carries encrypted configuration data from configuration logic 29 to decryptor 24  
25 and carries decrypted configuration data back to configuration logic 29. Bus 28  
26 allows decryptor 24 to access the keys for decrypting data. When the structure of  
27 Fig. 3 is being loaded with encrypted data, an attacker who monitors the bitstream  
28 as it is being loaded receives only the encrypted bitstream and can not learn the  
29 user's design by this method.

1 Partially Encrypted Bitstream

2 According to another aspect of the invention, the bitstream comprises two  
3 portions, a data portion representing the user's design that can be encrypted or  
4 not, and a control portion controlling loading of the bitstream (for example giving  
5 addresses of columns in the PLD into which successive portions of the bitstream  
6 are to be loaded, providing a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) code for checking  
7 reliability of the loading operation, and a starter number for cipher block chaining  
8 (CBC), a technique that prevents a "dictionary attack" where the decrypted data  
9 can be deduced from the frequency of occurrence of the encrypted data). In a  
10 preferred embodiment of the invention, the data portion may be encrypted but the  
11 control portion is unencrypted. This provides additional security because the PLD  
12 manufacturer needs to describe freely the control features of the bitstream, and if  
13 this relatively well known control information were encrypted, an attacker might  
14 be able to decrypt this information and use this information to decrypt the entire  
15 bitstream. Further, keeping the control portion of the bitstream unencrypted  
16 makes it easier for the PLD to use the information.

17 In another embodiment, used when the order of addresses in which  
18 configuration data is loaded may be useful to an attacker in analyzing the design,  
19 the address of the configuration data is also encrypted, but other control  
20 information in the configuration bitstream remains unencrypted.

21

22 Bitstream Format

23 Figs. 4a-4d illustrate differences in bitstream format and registers of  
24 configuration logic 29 in comparison to the format and registers of configuration  
25 logic 14 of the prior art product shown in Figs. 2a-2d. As shown in Fig. 4a, the  
26 bitstream still includes header words followed by data words. In a typical  
27 configuration, several control data words will be loaded into registers before  
28 encrypted configuration data begins. Fig. 4a shows an example in which three  
29 header words Header A, Header B, and Header C are each followed by three  
30 unencrypted control data words Data A, Data B, and Data C. (In an actual

1 configuration, more than three control data words will likely be provided. ) Next,  
2 Header D specifies that encrypted configuration data will follow and is followed  
3 by multiple words Data 1D, Data 2D, Data 3D, etc. of encrypted configuration  
4 data. These words have been shaded in Fig. 4a to emphasize that this data is  
5 encrypted.

6 As shown in Figs. 4b and 4c, a fourth op code has been added. In addition to  
7 the values 00 for no operation, 01 and 10 for read and write without decryption,  
8 the new value 11 specifies that writing is to be with decryption. (It is not  
9 important what code or what method is used to specify that decryption is to be  
10 used or even that it is specified through an op code. It is just important that  
11 optional encryption and decryption be allowed and indicated, so that designers  
12 can make use of this option. In the embodiment of Fig. 4d, two new configuration  
13 logic registers are added. Shown at addresses 1100 and 1101 are the register for  
14 holding a cipher block chaining (CBC) starter value and the address for the initial  
15 encryption key.

#### 17 Optional Encryption

18 According to another aspect of the invention, a PLD can accept both  
19 encrypted and unencrypted data portions of the bitstream. The control portion of  
20 the bitstream indicates whether the data portion of the bitstream is encrypted. If  
21 the data portion of the bitstream is encrypted, it is diverted within the PLD to a  
22 decryptor and after decryption is used to configure the PLD. If unencrypted, it is  
23 not diverted, and is used directly to configure the PLD.

24 There are some occasions for which it is preferable not to encrypt the  
25 bitstream. Certain test activities used during debugging a design require reading  
26 back the configuration information. It is more straight forward to diagnose a  
27 configuration problem if an encryption step has not been performed (especially if  
28 the designer is trying to determine whether encryption has anything to do with  
29 the problem). Also, if several designers are writing code to be implemented in  
30 parts of the PLD and different parts of the PLD are to be configured at different

1 times, it may be necessary to make all portions of the bitstream visible, and to  
2 allow the PLD to be partly reconfigured.

3 Figs. 5a and 5b show example bitstream portions representing the same  
4 design, first unencrypted and then encrypted, to illustrate the differences between  
5 an unencrypted bitstream and an encrypted bitstream in one embodiment of the  
6 invention. An actual bitstream includes the 0's and 1's at the right of the figures  
7 and none of the text at the left. The text at the left is provided to explain the  
8 meaning of the bits to the right. These bitstream portions use the commands  
9 illustrated in Figs. 4b-4d. In order to emphasize the differences between the  
10 unencrypted version of Fig. 5a and the encrypted version of Fig. 5b, the  
11 differences are shown in bold.

12 Looking at Fig. 5a, after a dummy word (a constant high signal interpreted  
13 as all 1's) and a sync word with a specified pattern of 1's and 0's, the next word is  
14 of type 001 with an op code of 10, has an address of 0000000000010000 and a word  
15 count of 00000000001. Thus this word addresses the command register CMD and  
16 specifies that one word will be written there. Fig. 5a has been annotated to the left  
17 of the bitstream to indicate that this word is Type 1 and indicates to write 1 word  
18 to CMD. The following word 111 is the data to be placed in command register  
19 CMD, and resets a CRC (cyclic redundancy check) register. (In a preferred  
20 embodiment, the PLD includes a circuit, not shown, such as described by  
21 Erickson in U.S. Patent 5,598,424 to calculate a CRC value from the bitstream as  
22 the bitstream is being loaded, and protects against glitches in the bitstream  
23 voltages that might cause incorrect bits to be loaded.) Next, a header word  
24 specifies that the format is again type 1 and it specifies to write 1 word to the  
25 frame length register FLR. The data word that follows, 11001, specifies the frame  
26 length (25 words). Similarly, several additional header and data words follow,  
27 including the header specifying the word to be written to the frame address  
28 register FAR. In this case, the following data word indicates data will start at  
29 address 0. Finally, after these registers have been loaded, a command comes to  
30 write data to the frame data input register FDRI, and since quite a bit of data will

1 be written, the word count is given as 00000000000 and a header of type 2 specifies  
2 that 10530 words will be written to the FDRI register. This is the actual design  
3 data that causes the PLD to be configured. Thus the next 10530 words in the  
4 bitstream are design data. Finally, to assure that data have been loaded correctly,  
5 the CRC value calculated by the device that originated the configuration data is  
6 loaded and compared to the CRC value that has been calculated by the PLD.  
7 Additional commands and data are loaded in order to indicate that configuration  
8 is complete and to move the PLD into operation mode.

9 Fig. 5b is similar to Fig. 5a, and differs only where the data and annotations  
10 are shown in bold. In Fig. 5b, the data are encrypted, and additional commands  
11 are used to provide the initial key address and to write two words (64 bits) to the  
12 CBC (cipher block chaining) register. Next, a type 1 header includes the op code  
13 11 and indicates that data will be decrypted before being written to frame data  
14 input register FDRI. A type 2 header follows, again with the op code 11, giving  
15 the instruction that 10530 words are to be decrypted and written to data input  
16 register FDRI. The 10530 encrypted data words then follow. Then the CRC word  
17 follows for confirming that the (encrypted) data were loaded correctly. Finally,  
18 the additional commands and data are sent, and place the PLD into operation  
19 mode if all is correct.

## 21 Decryption Process

22 Fig. 6 shows how optional decryption is accomplished in one embodiment.  
23 Fig. 6 shows the detail of configuration logic 29 and of buses 27 and 28 leading  
24 into decryptor 24. Bus 27 includes the following:

- 25 •the 3-bit initial decryption key address "Init\_key\_addr" taken from  
26 register address 1101 (Fig. 4d) in configuration logic 29,
- 27 •the 64-bit modified cipher block chaining value "modCBC". This value is  
28 formed by replacing the lower order bits of the 64-bit CBC value  
29 taken from register address 1100 (Fig. 4d) in configuration logic 29  
30 with the 22-bit Frame Address value specified in Register 0001.



- 1       •the 64 lines "Encrypted\_data" for loading encrypted data, taken from the
- 2             bitstream,
- 3       •the 64 lines "Decrypted\_data" for returning the decrypted data produced
- 4             by decryptor 24 to configuration logic 29,
- 5       •a line for the signal "Enc\_data\_rdy" that tells decryptor 24 that data is on
- 6             the "Encrypted\_data\_ lines and that decryptor 24 can start
- 7             decrypting,
- 8       •a line for the signal "Dec\_data\_rdy" that tells configuration logic 29 that
- 9             decryption on a 64-bit word is complete and is available on the
- 10            "Decrypted\_data" lines, and
- 11       •a Bad\_key\_set line used by decryptor 24 to cause configuration logic 29 to
- 12            abort the configuration and set a status register accordingly when
- 13            the keys have not been used as specified, for example, by the bits in
- 14            key memory that designate whether the keys are to be first, middle,
- 15            or last of a set. In the embodiment shown in Fig. 4d, the status
- 16            register is at address 0111, and the Bad\_key\_set error is indicated by
- 17            storing a logic 1 in one of the bits.

18   Bus 28 is comprised of the following:

- 19       •3 lines for the key address, which is initially the key address provided
- 20            from bus 27, but which is updated each time a new key is used,
- 21       •56 lines for the decryption key, and
- 22       •2 lines for indicating whether the decryption key is the first, middle, last,
- 23            or only key to be used.

24

#### 25   Preventing Design Relocation

26       One potential attack on a design in an encrypted bitstream is to change the  
27   frame address register (starting address) in the encrypted bitstream so that when  
28   it is decrypted it is loaded into a portion of the FPGA visible when the FPGA is  
29   being used. In some designs the content of the block RAM is visible. In all  
30   designs the configuration of the input/output ports is visible and therefore the

1 configuration bits can be determined. Thus if successive portions of the design  
2 were moved to visible portions of the FPGA, even though the FPGA did not  
3 function properly, an attacker could in repeated relocation learn the contents of  
4 the unencrypted bitstream.

5 To prevent design relocation, in one embodiment, an initial value used by  
6 the cipher block chaining method used with the DES standard is modified. Figs.  
7 7a and 7b show the encryption and decryption portions of a triple DES algorithm,  
8 respectively, as modified according to the invention. The standard cipher block  
9 chaining method starts the encryption process by XORing a starting number (can  
10 be designer supplied or randomly generated) with the first word of data to be  
11 encrypted. According to the invention, part of the random number is replaced by  
12 address information, in the present example the 22-bit address of the first frame  
13 into which data will be loaded in configuration memory 12. The starter CBC value,  
14 a 64-bit number, has its least significant bits, labeled x, replaced by the frame  
15 address, labeled y, to produce a modified 64-bit value that depends upon the  
16 address into which data will be loaded. This modified CBC value is XORed with  
17 the first word of configuration information Word1. Then the encryption  
18 algorithm is used to produce the first encrypted word Encrypted Word1, which is  
19 placed into the bitstream. Fig. 7a shows a triple encryption algorithm with outer  
20 cipher block chaining, comprising an encryption step  $enc_1$  using the first key,  
21 followed by a decryption step  $dec_2$  using the second key, followed by an  
22 encryption step  $enc_3$  using the third key. This first encrypted word Encrypted  
23 Word1 is XORed with the second unencrypted word Word2 and the encryption  
24 process is repeated to produce encrypted Word2. The XOR chaining continues  
25 until all configuration data have been encrypted.

26 As shown in Fig. 7b, the PLD must perform the reverse process to derive the  
27 decrypted words. For the above encryption sequence, the decryption sequence  
28 would be decryption step  $dec_1$  using key 3, then encryption step  $enc_2$  using key 2,  
29 then decryption step  $dec_3$  using key 1. Importantly, part of the initial value for  
30 generating Decrypted Word1 is to use the same frame address for both encryption

1 and decryption. The PLD, not the bitstream, generates the modified CBC value  
2 from the frame address stored in the frame address register, which is also used to  
3 specify the frame of configuration memory 12 into which configuration data are to  
4 be loaded. So if an attacker changes the frame address into which the data are to  
5 be loaded, the modified CBC value changes accordingly, and the configuration  
6 data are not correctly decrypted.

7 The XOR step produces the original data that was in the designer's bitstream  
8 before it was encrypted. Original Word1 = Decrypted Word1, for example. This  
9 decrypted configuration data is sent on bus 27 (Fig. 3) to configuration logic 29.

#### 11 Configuration Logic 29

12 Configuration logic 29 includes the structures to support optional encryption  
13 as well as the structures to prevent design relocation and a single key attack. As  
14 shown in Fig. 6, configuration logic 29 includes a holding register 292, control  
15 logic 291, configuration registers (FDRI, FAR, CRC, and init CBC are shown),  
16 decryptor 24 interface multiplexers 294 and 295, 64-bit assembly register 297, and  
17 registers 298 and 299 (for interfacing with configuration access port 21). A 64-bit  
18 shift register 299 receives data from configuration access port 21, which can be a  
19 single pin for 1-bit wide data or 8 pins for 8-bit wide data. This data is loaded into  
20 64-bit shift register 299 until register 299 is full. Then these 64 bits are preferably  
21 shifted in parallel into 64-bit transfer register 298. From there, multiplexer 296b  
22 alternately selects right and left 32-bit words, and multiplexer 296a moves the data  
23 32 bits at a time either into holding register 292 or alternately into High and Low  
24 portions of assembly register 297 as controlled by control line M. When loading of  
25 the bitstream begins, line M and a clock signal not shown cause multiplexers 296a  
26 and 296b to move data from 64-bit transfer register 298 to holding register 292.  
27 From there these words are applied to control logic 291. If the word is a header,  
28 control logic 291 interprets the word. If the op code indicates the data to follow  
29 are to be written unencrypted, control logic 291 places an address on bus G to  
30 select a register, places a signal on line L to cause multiplexer 294 to connect bus B

1 to bus D, and applies the following word on bus B. On the next clock signal (clock  
2 signals are not shown), the data on bus D are loaded into the addressed register.  
3 All registers shown in Fig. 4d can be loaded this way. The init CBC register for  
4 loading the initial cipher block chaining value is a 64-bit register and receives two  
5 consecutive 32-bit words, as shown in Fig. 5b and discussed above.

6 A modified CBC value formed from (1) the original CBC value stored in the  
7 init CBC register and (2) the initial frame address stored in the FAR register is  
8 available to decryptor 24. In one embodiment, the initial frame address in the  
9 FAR register uses no more than 32 bits while the init CBC value uses 64 bits. In  
10 the embodiment of Fig. 6, the 64-bit bus providing the modified CBC value  
11 includes 22 bits from the frame address register FAR and 42 bits from the init CBC  
12 register. Important to the security provided by the present invention, note that  
13 this value depends upon where configuration data will be loaded. If an attacker  
14 were to try to load encrypted data into a different place by changing the contents  
15 of the FAR register, the modCBC value fed to decryptor 24 would also change.

16 When the op code command to decrypt a number of words of configuration  
17 data is received by control logic 291, the decryption process begins. Control line  
18 M causes multiplexer 296a to apply data from transfer register 298 to bus A  
19 leading to assembly register 297. Control bus H alternately connects bus A to the  
20 High[31:0] and Low[31:0] portions of encrypted data register 297 to form a 64-bit  
21 word to be decrypted. Control logic 291 then asserts the Enc\_data\_rdy signal,  
22 which causes decryptor 24 to decrypt the data in register 297.

23 To perform the decryption, decryptor 24 applies a key address KeyAddr on  
24 bus 28 to key memory 23 (Fig. 3). This causes key memory 23 to return the 56-bit  
25 key in that address on the 56-bit Key lines. It also causes key memory 23 to return  
26 two additional bits "Order" also stored in the key data at that address. For the  
27 first decryption key, these two bits must indicate that this is a first key or an only  
28 key. If not, decryptor 24 asserts the Bad\_key\_set signal, which causes control logic  
29 29 to abort the configuration operation. If these two bits indicate the key is a first  
30 or only key, decryptor 24 performs the decryption, using for example the well

1 known DES algorithm (described by Schneier, *ibid*). If the key isn't an only key,  
2 decryptor 24 then gets the key at the next address in key memory 23, and checks  
3 to see if the two Order bits indicate it is a middle or last key. If not, the  
4 Bad\_key\_set signal is asserted and the configuration is aborted. If so, decryption  
5 is performed. If it is a middle key, another round of decryption is done. If it is the  
6 last key, decryptor 24 forms the XOR function of the decrypted word and the  
7 value modCBC. Decryptor 24 then places the resultant value on the 64-bit  
8 Decrypted\_data bus and asserts the Dec\_data\_rdy signal. This causes control logic  
9 291 to place signals on control line K to cause multiplexer 295 to break the 64-bit  
10 word into two sequential 32-bit words. Control logic 291 places a signal on line L  
11 to cause multiplexer 294 to forward the 32-bit words of decrypted data to bus D.  
12 Control logic 291 also places address signals on bus G to address frame data input  
13 register FDRI. The next clock signal moves the decrypted data to bus E where it is  
14 loaded into the frame register and when the frame register is full, eventually  
15 shifted into configuration memory 12 at the address indicated in the FAR register.

16 The modCBC value is used only once in the decryption operation.  
17 Subsequent 64-bit words of encrypted data are decrypted and then chained using  
18 the previously decrypted data for the XOR operation. (The value stored in the  
19 FAR register is also used only once to select a frame address. Subsequently, the  
20 frame address is simply incremented every time a frame is filled.)

21

## 22 Flow of Operations

23 Fig. 8 indicates the flow of operations performed by configuration logic 29  
24 and decryptor 24. Configuration logic 29 begins at step 70 by loading the bitstream  
25 headers and placing the corresponding data into configuration logic registers  
26 shown in Fig. 4b, including determining bitstream length. At step 71, as a further  
27 part of the start-up sequence, configuration logic 29 reads the first configuration  
28 memory address. Recall that the bitstream format includes an op code that  
29 indicates whether encryption is being used. Step 72 branches on the op code  
30 value. If encryption is not used, the process is shown on the left portion of Fig. 8.

1 If encryption is used, the process is shown in the right of Fig. 8. For no encryption,  
2 at step 73, configuration logic 29 sets a counter equal to the bitstream word count  
3 (see Fig. 4c). At step 74, 32 bits (1 word) of configuration data are sent to the  
4 addressed frame of configuration memory 12. If step 75 indicates the counter is  
5 not finished, then at step 76 the counter is decremented and the next 1 word of  
6 configuration data are sent to configuration memory 12. When the counter has  
7 finished, configuration logic 29 performs cleanup activities including reading the  
8 final cyclic redundancy value to compare with a value at the end of the bitstream  
9 to determine whether there were any errors in loading the bitstream.

10 If step 72 indicates the bitstream is encrypted, the counter is loaded with the  
11 word count, and at step 81 the process loads the initial key address from key  
12 address register 293 (Fig. 6) into decryptor 24.

13 At step 82, two words (64 bits) of encrypted configuration data are loaded  
14 into decryptor 24. At step 83 the addressed key is loaded into decryptor 24. In  
15 one embodiment, a 64-bit number is loaded into decryptor 24. This 64-bit number  
16 includes a 56-bit key, two bits that indicate whether it is the first, middle, last, or  
17 only key, and some other bits that may be unused, used for parity, or used for  
18 another purpose. In another embodiment, the 64-bit key data includes a single bit  
19 that indicates whether it is or is not the last key. In yet another embodiment, the  
20 64-bit key data includes an address for the next key so the keys don't need to be  
21 used in sequential order. In another embodiment, extra bits are not present and  
22 the key data uses less than 64 bits. In yet another embodiment, the bitstream  
23 rather than the key indicates how many keys are to be used, but this is believed to  
24 be less secure because an attacker can see how many keys are used and perform a  
25 single key attack, breaking one key at a time, whereas using the keys to indicate  
26 how many keys are to be used does not give this information to an attacker.

27 At step 84, decryptor 24 decrypts the 64-bit data with the 56-bit key using,  
28 for example, the DES algorithm. The DES algorithm is described in the above-  
29 mentioned book by Bruce Schneier at pages 265 to 278. Other encryption  
30 algorithms may also be used, for example, the advanced encryption standard AES.

1 Other algorithms may require more key bits. For example AES requires a key of  
2 128 to 256 bits.

3 Step 85 determines whether more keys are to be used. The two bits that  
4 indicate whether the key is first, middle, last, or only key are examined to  
5 determine whether this is the last key, and if not, the key address is incremented  
6 and decryptor 24 addresses the next key in memory 23.

7 After the last key has been used, at step 87, the modified CBC value shown in  
8 Fig. 6 as a 64-bit value from combining registers FAR and init CBC is XORed with  
9 the decrypted value obtained in step 87. In one embodiment, 22 bits of the 64-bit  
10 random number loaded into the CBC register are replaced with the frame address  
11 of the beginning of the bitstream. The goal of the encryption process is to have  
12 every digit of the 64-bit encrypted value be a function of all previous bits plus the  
13 key. The goal of combining the CBC value with the first address is to cause the  
14 decrypted values to change if the bitstream is loaded into a different address from  
15 the intended starting address. Step 87 achieves both goals. The new CBC value is  
16 then stored. Storage may be in the FAR and init CBC registers shown in Fig. 6, or  
17 in another register located in decryptor 24.

18 At step 88, this decrypted configuration data is sent on bus 27 (Fig. 3) to  
19 configuration logic 29. Configuration logic 29 calculates an updated cyclic  
20 redundancy check value to be compared with the cyclic redundancy value stored  
21 in the CRC register at the end of the loading process. If configuration logic 29 has  
22 been set to use encryption, a multiplexer in configuration logic 29 forwards this  
23 decrypted configuration data to the addressed column of configuration memory  
24 12.

25 At step 89 the counter is checked and if not finished, at step 96 the counter is  
26 decremented and the process returns to step 82 where the next 64 bits (2 words)  
27 are loaded from the bitstream.

28 Finally, when step 89 indicates the counter is finished, at step 90, a CRC  
29 (cyclic redundancy check) value in the bitstream is compared with a CRC value  
30 calculated as the bitstream is loaded. If the values agree, configuration is complete

1 and the FPGA goes into operation. If the values do not agree, a loading error has  
2 occurred and the entire configuration process is aborted.

3  
4 Evaluating Key Order - Preventing Single Key Attack

5 Fig. 9 shows a state machine implemented by decryptor 24 to evaluate key  
6 order. The state machine remains in state S1 until the Enc\_data\_ready signal is  
7 activated. This signal indicates decryption can begin and moves to decision state  
8 Q1 where decryptor 24 applies the address specified by the address Init\_key\_addr  
9 on bus 27 to bus 28, reads back a key and a key order, and from the two bits of key  
10 order data determines whether the key is a first or only key. If not, decryptor 24  
11 sends the Bad\_key\_set signal to control logic 291 and causes configuration logic 29  
12 to abort the configuration. If the address is first or only, decryptor 24 goes to state  
13 S3, which decrypts the data. Then the state machine goes to decision state Q2,  
14 which determines whether the key is last or only. If so, decryption is complete  
15 and at state S4 decryptor 24 returns the decrypted data to configuration logic 29.  
16 If not, in state S5, decryptor 24 increments the key address, and gets the new key.  
17 The state machine asks question Q3 to determine whether the next key is a middle  
18 or last key. If not, state S2 causes the configuration to abort. If the key is middle  
19 or last, the state machine returns to state S3 to decrypt the data again. In another  
20 embodiment, in state S4 decryptor 24 also performs the step of XORing the  
21 decrypted data with a CBC value.

22 The benefit of storing the key order within the keys is that an attacker can  
23 not implement a single key attack because the attacker can not prevent decryptor  
24 24 from using all the keys specified by key memory 23 (as intended by the  
25 designer) when performing decryption. It is not necessary to ask the second and  
26 third questions Q2 and Q3 to protect against an attacker using a single key attack,  
27 since the key order is stored within the key data inside the PLD. However, it is  
28 beneficial to the designer or board tester who loads the keys to ask all three  
29 questions to make sure that each key has been labeled correctly when it is loaded.



1 In one embodiment, decryptor 24 uses the triple DES standard with a  
2 decryption-encryption-decryption sequence, alternating the algorithm (only  
3 slightly) each time another key is used. Such a combination is in accordance with  
4 the ANSI X9.52 1998 Triple DES standard. In another embodiment, decryption is  
5 used each time.

#### 6 7 Key Memory 23

8 The circuit shown in Fig. 10a includes three components: battery supply  
9 switch 22, control logic 23a and key registers 23b. Control logic circuit 23a and  
10 key registers 23b comprise key memory 23 of Fig. 3. In the embodiment of Fig.  
11 10a, key registers 23b comprise six 64-bit words. Of course, other key memory  
12 sizes may alternatively be used. In other embodiments, there may be far more  
13 than six keys stored in key memory 23, and more than 3 bits needed to give the  
14 address of the key to be used. The power supply for key registers 23b comes from  
15 battery supply switch 22 on line VSWITCH. When key memory supply voltage  
16 VCCI is insufficient or not present, battery supply switch 22 applies the battery  
17 backup voltage VBATT to the VSWITCH line so that VSWITCH carries a positive  
18 voltage.

19 In this embodiment each key register has 64 memory cells. Each cell receives  
20 a write enable signal WE, that when high causes data to be written to the cell and  
21 when low causes data in the cell to be held. Cells in one register have a common  
22 write enable signal WE. When the PLD supply voltage (different from VCCI) is  
23 absent such that the WE signals are not actively driven, weak pull-down  
24 transistors such as T1 pull down the WE signal so that none of the key memory  
25 registers can be addressed, and none of the memory cells are disturbed.

26 In one embodiment, the JTAG port of a PLD is used to load decryption keys  
27 into the PLD. The memory cell supply voltage is at the device voltage level of  
28 VCCI during normal operation, and in one embodiment this level is between 3.0  
29 and 3.6 volts. Signals applied to the JTAG port may be several different voltages.  
30 Also, there may be several different internal voltages. Thus voltage translation is

1 needed. This voltage translation is performed in the memory cells. Detail of a  
2 memory cell is shown in Fig. 10b. The latch comprising inverters I1 and I2 is  
3 powered by VSWITCH and is thus powered whether or not a device supply  
4 voltage VCCI is present. The WE signal and the inverted data signal data\_b both  
5 operate at the 1.5 volt level. These signals drive NMOS transistors T4, T5, and T6,  
6 and through inverter I3 (also using the 1.5 volt supply voltage) transistor T7. Fig.  
7 10b shows that when WE is low, transistors T4 and T5 are off, and the content of  
8 the latch comprising inverters I1 and I2 is retained. When WE is high, one of  
9 inverters I1 and I2 is pulled low, thus loading the new data into the latch.

10 Control logic circuit 23a receives signals from JTAG bus 25 (also shown in  
11 Fig. 3). JTAG bus 25 includes control signals for writing, reading, setting the  
12 secure mode, and data and address buses. This interface conforms to the IEEE  
13 1532 JTAG standard. Before key memory 23 can be accessed through JTAG bus  
14 25, the security status (bus 26) is placed in non-secure mode, which can be done  
15 using the ISC\_PROGRAM\_SECURITY instruction (see Fig. 10a) and applying  
16 logic 1 to bit 0 of the key data bus. Key memory 23 is written to and read (for  
17 verification) from JTAG bus 25 using the ISC\_PROGRAM and ISC\_READ  
18 instructions of the IEEE 1532 standard. Control logic 23a includes a decoder for  
19 decoding the 3-bit address signal ADDR from JTAG bus 25 to produce a low-  
20 going pulse on the addressed one of write strobe lines ws\_b[5:0] if the  
21 ISC\_PROGRAM instruction appears on JTAG bus 25, or a high signal on the  
22 addressed one of read select lines rsel[5:0] if the ISC\_READ instruction appears  
23 on JTAG bus 25. One of the six 64-bit words can be read by applying a high  
24 signal to one of the six read select lines rsel[5:0], which causes read multiplexer  
25 23d to place the selected word on the 64 output lines q[63:0]. Only one of the write  
26 select lines or read select lines is selected at one time. When no read select signal  
27 is asserted, a high park\_low signal causes 64 transistors 23e to pull down the 64  
28 lines q[63:0] and prevent these lines from floating.

29 If key memory 23 is operating in non-secure mode, the 64-bit words can be  
30 read from key registers 23b to JTAG bus 25 where the values can be examined

1 external to the FPGA. The FPGA can be tested in this non-secure mode by using  
2 56 bits of a selected 64-bit word in registers 23b as the 56-bit key for DES  
3 decryption. In one embodiment, when key memory 23 is in non-secure mode,  
4 readback of a user's design is possible even though the design has been encrypted  
5 before loading. This allows the designer to test and debug even an encrypted  
6 design. Communication of the key security status is through bus 26 (see also  
7 Fig. 3).

8 After values have been written into key registers 23b and verified with a  
9 read operation from bus 25, control logic 23a is placed into secure mode by using  
10 the ISC\_PROGRAM\_SECURITY instruction and applying logic 0 to bit 0 of the 64-  
11 bit key data bus which is part of the IEEE 1532 standard. In the secure mode, no  
12 access to the keys is granted.

13 As shown in Fig. 11, to assure that an attacker can not return to the non-  
14 secure mode by using the ISC\_PROGRAM\_SECURITY instruction and then  
15 reading out the keys, if the security is eliminated (if the  
16 ISC\_PROGRAM\_SECURITY signal moves to the non-secure logic level), a state  
17 machine in control logic 23a erases all keys by writing zeros to all six words, one  
18 word at a time. This is done by: in step 110 putting zeros on the wdata[63:0] bus  
19 and at step 111 asserting the ws\_b[0] signal (with a logic 0 value), then at steps  
20 112-117 successively strobing the ws\_b[0:0] through ws\_b[5:0] signals one at a  
21 time before changing the security status at step 118 and entering the non-secure  
22 mode, and finally at step 119 releasing the wdata[63:0] logic 0 values. Thus, any  
23 attempt to place battery backed up memory 23 into a non-secure mode causes all  
24 values in key registers 23b to be erased.

25 To communicate whether key memory 23 is in secure mode, control logic 23a  
26 sends a secure mode signal on bus 26 (may be a single line) to configuration logic  
27 29 to indicate that key memory 23 is operating in secure mode. If this signal  
28 switches to non-secure mode, configuration logic 29 clears the design from  
29 configuration memory 12. Note that an unencrypted bitstream may be loaded by

1 configuration logic 29 into configuration memory 12 even though keys are stored  
2 in key registers 23b and key memory 23 is in a secure mode.

#### 4 Loading the Keys, Multiple Encryption Keys

5 Decryption keys must be loaded into the PLD before the PLD is put into a  
6 secure mode where a user can not learn details of the design. In the embodiment  
7 shown in Fig. 3, the key or keys are loaded through a JTAG port 20.

8 As a feature of the invention, the encryption keys are loaded through this  
9 JTAG port 20. It is expected that JTAG programmers will load the encryption keys  
10 during board testing. When the RAM for storing keys is in a non-secure mode, the  
11 user has full access to it and can read out both the keys and the design, even if the  
12 design has been encrypted. This is useful for the designer while testing the keys  
13 and the use of the keys. Then once the designer is satisfied with the operation, he  
14 or she can send another instruction through the JTAG port and place the key  
15 memory into a secure mode. Once the key memory has been placed into secure  
16 mode, the keys can not be read out. Further, moving the key memory from  
17 secure to non-secure mode erases the keys by activating a circuit that starts up the  
18 memory initialization process. (Fig. 15, discussed below, shows a state machine  
19 for performing this function.)

20 According to one aspect of the invention, more than one key may be used to  
21 encrypt the design. For example, if three keys are to be used, the bitstream is first  
22 encrypted using the first key, then the resulting encrypted bitstream is again  
23 encrypted using the second key, then finally the resulting doubly encrypted  
24 bitstream is again encrypted using the third key. This triply encrypted bitstream  
25 is stored, for example in a PROM or flash memory on the printed circuit board  
26 that holds the PLD.

27 For decryption, these keys are used in succession (reverse order) to  
28 repeatedly decrypt the encrypted bitstream. Further to this, if more keys are  
29 stored in the PLD than are used for decrypting a particular design, the encrypted  
30 bitstream may include in an unencrypted portion an indication of how many keys

1 are to be used, and the address of the first key. Such an embodiment may make it  
2 easier for an attacker to decrypt the bitstream because the attacker need only deal  
3 with one key at a time. Alternatively, the keys themselves may indicate whether  
4 they are the first, middle, last, or only keys. Thus the same PLD can at different  
5 times be programmed to perform different functions (configured with different  
6 designs), and information about the values of the different keys can be made  
7 available to only one or some of the designers. Thus a first designer may not learn  
8 about a second design even though both designs are implemented in the same  
9 PLD (at different times).

10 Regarding Fig. 3, configuration logic 29 includes additional logic beyond  
11 configuration logic 14 of Fig. 1. As in the structure of Fig. 1, the bitstream on  
12 configuration access port 21 is treated as words, in one embodiment 32-bit words.  
13 Several of the words, usually at or near the beginning of the bitstream, contain  
14 header information, for example length of the bitstream, starting address for the  
15 configuration data. New to the bitstream of the present invention is an indication  
16 as to whether the bitstream is encrypted, and the address of a key for decrypting  
17 configuration data in the bitstream.

#### 18 19 Battery Backed up Memory

20 Values stored in key memory 23 are preferably retained by a battery when  
21 power to the FPGA is removed.

22 Further, other memories than encryption keys can also be backed up using a  
23 battery supply switch such as switch 22. In particular, a PLD can be  
24 manufactured in which the VSWITCH voltage supply is routed to all flip flops in  
25 the PLD if the purpose is to preserve data generated by the PLD when the PLD is  
26 powered down. And if the purpose is to also preserve configuration of the PLD  
27 when the PLD is powered down, configuration memory 12 (Fig. 3) may  
28 alternatively be powered from VSWITCH, though such an embodiment requires  
29 considerably more battery power than does powering just the flip flops in the

1 PLD, and powering flip flops in turn requires more battery power than does  
2 powering a very small memory for storing a few encryption keys.

3 Fig. 12 shows a structure for battery supply switch 22. In this embodiment,  
4 VBATT level shift circuit 31 allows the PLD to use different voltages for the  
5 battery and main power supply. And of course the purpose of the circuit is to deal  
6 with varying voltage levels. In one embodiment, battery supply switch 22 can  
7 handle VCCI voltages up to 3.6 volts, and switches to battery power when VCCI  
8 falls below about 1 volt. Battery voltage can be between 1.0 volts and 3.6 volts.

9 Battery supply switch 22 includes four output driving P-channel transistors  
10 P0 through P3. Transistors P0 and P1 turn on and off together as do transistors P2  
11 and P3. The circuit includes two transistors for each leg instead of one in order to  
12 avoid any possibility that VCCI and VBATT will be connected together.  
13 Transistor P0 includes a parasitic diode (the p-n junction between the drain and  
14 substrate) that can conduct current upward in the figure even when the transistor  
15 is off. To prevent such current flow, transistor P1 is added and has its substrate  
16 connected to its drain so that parasitic diode conduction can only be downward.  
17 A similar arrangement is made with transistors P2 and P3. Thus there is no  
18 possibility that current will conduct from VBATT to VCCI or from VCCI to  
19 VBATT. Inverters 33 and 34 are powered from the VSWITCH voltage, so they are  
20 always operational even when VCCI is off. Transistor P4 is a resistor, always on,  
21 and provides protection against electrostatic discharge. Most of the time, the  
22 structures controlled through transistor P4 do not draw current, so there is usually  
23 no voltage drop across transistor P4.

24 Fig. 13 shows one embodiment of VBATT level shift circuit 31. Output  
25 voltage at terminal OUT is controlled by signals IN and INB. These signals are  
26 generated by inverters 33 and 34, which derive their supply voltage from the  
27 VSWITCH node. Therefore, if VSWITCH is supplied by VBATT, one of signals IN  
28 and INB will be at voltage VBATT and the other will be at ground. However, if  
29 VSWITCH is supplied by VCCI, one of IN and INB will be at the VCCI voltage  
30 level. If IN is at VCCI and INB is at ground, transistor 45 will be on and transistor

46 will be off. The gate of P-channel transistor 43 will be low, and transistor 43 will be on, pulling the input of inverter 47 to VBATT. The output of transistor 48 will also be at VBATT. Returning to Fig. 12, a voltage level VBATT at the gate of transistor P0 will positively turn off transistor P0.

Fig. 14 shows VCCI detect circuit 32. VCCI detect circuit 32 determines when the voltage on line VSWITCH will be switched to the battery and back to VCCI. This embodiment of circuit 32 is essentially a string of five inverter stages I1 through I5. Controlling of the switching voltage occurs primarily at inverter stage I1. Transistors 52 and 53 form a CMOS inverter. Power to this CMOS inverter must flow through P-channel transistor 51, which doesn't turn on until VCCI reaches the threshold voltage of transistor 51, typically 0.7-0.8 volts. If VCCI is switching slowly, taking several milliseconds to reach full voltage, transistor 51 delays the activation of circuit I1. When transistor 51 turns on, the source (upper terminal) of transistor 52 goes to VCCI. N-channel transistor 53 typically has a threshold voltage of about 0.7-0.8 volts as well but is sized as a weak transistor relative to transistor 52. In one embodiment, transistor 53 has a width/length ratio of 1/18 whereas transistor 52 has a width/length ratio of 3/2. So transistor 53 pulls the input of inverter I2 low only until transistor 52 turns on. In one embodiment, circuit I1 pulls the input of inverter stage I2 high when VCCI is at about 1.0 volt. Thus the output of inverter 54 goes low. Inverter stage I3 is a Schmitt trigger. The zero volt input to inverter stage I3 turns off transistors 56 and 57 and turns on transistor 55, pulling node N3 to VCCI and turning on transistor 58, which pulls up node N4, thus raising the voltage at which transistor 56 will turn on, and preventing small variations in VCCI from switching the voltage at node N3. Inverters 59 and 60 are optional and produce a sharper edge of the output signals usebatt and usebattb that cause battery supply switch 22 of Fig. 12 to switch from VBATT to VCCI. Transistor 61, controlled by the VBATT' signal, is a weak pull-down transistor and assures that the usebattb line is pulled low when VCCI is not present and therefore not providing an output signal from inverter 60.

Key Not Available to Purchaser of a Product Containing the Configured PLD

In order to prevent an attacker from learning the design that has been used to configure the PLD, several additional steps may be taken.

According to another aspect, a key is loaded into the PLD before sale of a system incorporating the PLD, such that after sale of a system including the PLD, the design can be loaded into the PLD and used, but an attacker can not learn the value stored in the key (or keys). Thus the unencrypted design can not be read or copied. To achieve this security, several steps are taken.

Secure Mode Preservation (Tamper-proofing)

In one embodiment, there are two security flags in configuration logic 29 of the PLD. One indicates whether the decryption keys are secured, and the other indicates whether the design is a decrypted design and must be protected. If JTAG logic 13 (Fig. 3) selects secure mode with the ISC\_PROGRAM\_SECURITY instruction, a secure\_key flag in control logic 23a (Fig. 10a) is set. If the bitstream loaded into the PLD has the indication that design data in the bitstream is encrypted, a secure\_design flag in configuration logic 29 (not shown) is set. If either flag is later unset, the entire configuration memory is cleared, thereby removing the decrypted design. If the secure\_key flag is reset (by an ISC\_PROGRAM\_SECURITY instruction), then the keys are also erased.

Fig. 15 shows a state machine for performing the design clearing function. When the secure\_design flag is set, the state machine enters state S1. This state monitors a change from secure to non-secure mode of the secure\_design flag. As long as the secure-design mode continues, the state machine stays in state S1. Once a change occurs, the state machine enters state S2 and the data shift registers for shifting data into configuration memory 12 are reset, thereby placing zeroes on all data lines for the configuration memory bits. Next, the state machine moves to state S3 where the word line of the addressed frame is asserted. This results in the zeros on the data shift register lines being written into the memory bits at the addressed frame. If question Q1 indicates there are more frames to be addressed,



1 the state machine moves to state S4 where the frame address is advanced and the  
2 state machine returns to state S3. When question Q1 indicates there are no more  
3 frames to be addressed, the process is done and the configuration memory is  
4 cleared.

5 It is also necessary to protect the keys from being accessed by an attacker.  
6 Loading of the keys is performed before a system containing the design is made  
7 available to an end customer. When designers are in the process of developing the  
8 design, they may wish to operate the PLD in a non-secure mode for debugging. In  
9 order to allow for this debugging operation and also to preserve security of the  
10 keys, the key loading process begins in a non-secure mode by clearing all key  
11 registers. A secure key flag must be kept in the non-secure mode while keys are  
12 loaded and while the keys are read back for verification. The secure key flag may  
13 also be kept in the non-secure mode while a configuration bitstream is loaded and  
14 decrypted. But once the secure key flag is set, returning the secure key flag to the  
15 non-secure mode clears all keys and also initiates operation of the state machine of  
16 Fig. 15. So, not only are the keys cleared, but the configuration is also cleared.

#### 18 Readback Attack and Readback Disabled

19 Some FPGAs allow a bitstream to be read back out of the FPGA so that a  
20 user may debug a design or may obtain state machine information from flip flops  
21 in the FPGA. Unless the design were re-encrypted for the read-back operation, the  
22 act of reading back the bitstream would expose the unencrypted bitstream to  
23 view.

24 Further security of the design is provided by disabling readback when an  
25 encrypted design is loaded into the FPGA. In one embodiment, readback is  
26 disabled only if the decryption keys are also secured.

27 Fig. 16 shows the block diagram of a structure for loading and reading back  
28 configuration memory. In one embodiment, configuration logic 29 prevents  
29 readback when two conditions are present: (1) the security status line on data bus  
30 26 (see Figs. 3 and 10) indicates that the keys are in a secure mode, and (2)

1 configuration logic 29 has responded to op codes in a configuration bitstream that  
2 indicate the bitstream is encrypted. So if either the keys are not secured or the  
3 bitstream is not encrypted, readback can be enabled. In other embodiments,  
4 different conditions control whether readback can be enabled.

5 When configuration logic 29 receives in the bitstream a header indicating  
6 that readback is to be performed, it sends on line 107 the frame address stored in  
7 its frame address register, which is decoded by address decoder 110 to select the  
8 addressed line of bus 109. Next, word line enable signal on line 108 is asserted,  
9 which asserts the selected word line of bus 109 to allow memory cells addressed  
10 by the selected word line to place their values on the n data lines 102 (n is the  
11 frame length and is stored in configuration logic 29). Configuration logic 29 then  
12 asserts the Load signal on line 104 to load the frame of data (in parallel) into data  
13 shift register 101. Next, configuration logic 29 asserts the shift signal on line 105 to  
14 cause data shift register 101 to shift out the frame of data in 32-bit words on bus  
15 103 to the frame data output register (see Fig. 4d) and from there to an outgoing  
16 bitstream on configuration access port 21 (Fig. 3).

17 If decryption is indicated in the bitstream, configuration logic 29 sets internal  
18 flags to indicate this. If these flags are set and key memory 23 is in secure mode as  
19 indicated by the security status signal on bus 26, then configuration logic 29  
20 responds to a readback command in the bitstream by keeping the word line  
21 enable signal on line 108 inactive and by keeping the load and shift signals on lines  
22 104 and 105 inactive to prevent readback. However, if key memory 23 is not in  
23 secure mode, even though the design may be encrypted, readback is allowed so  
24 that testing and debugging are possible.

#### 25 26 Partial Reconfiguration Attack and Prevention

27 Some FPGAs allow partial reconfiguration of the FPGA or allow different  
28 parts of a design to be loaded into different parts of the FPGA using separate  
29 starting addresses and separate write instructions. An attacker might attempt to  
30 learn the design by partially reconfiguring the design to read contents of a block

1 RAM or flip flops directly to output ports or by adding a section to an existing  
2 design to read out information that can be used to learn the design. For example,  
3 the attacker might partially reconfigure the PLD with an unencrypted design  
4 whose only purpose is to extract information about the encrypted design. Such a  
5 Trojan Horse design could be loaded into the PLD with another bitstream or  
6 attached to an existing encrypted bitstream. If the attacker was interested in  
7 learning a state machine design loaded into block RAM of an FPGA, for example,  
8 the Trojan Horse design could include logic to cycle through the addresses of the  
9 block RAM and send the block RAM data contents to package pins.

10 In order to prevent an attacker from making such changes, if the original  
11 design is encrypted, configuration logic 29 disallows partial reconfiguration once  
12 configuration with decryption is started. Configuration logic 29 disallows a  
13 further write instruction once a header with the decryption op code has been  
14 processed. Also, configuration logic 29 disallows configuration with decryption  
15 once configuration without encryption has been done. Configuration logic 29  
16 accomplishes these restrictions by ignoring headers that write to configuration  
17 memory after a decrypt instruction has been received and ignoring headers that  
18 have a decrypt command if an unencrypted portion of a design has been loaded.  
19 Thus, if any op code indicates that writing with decryption is being used, the PLD  
20 will accept only a single write instruction.

## 21 22 Additional Embodiments

23 The above description of the drawings gives detail on a few embodiments.  
24 However, many additional embodiments are also possible. For example, instead  
25 of the cipher block chaining algorithm discussed above, one can use an encryption  
26 method called cipher feedback mode in which data can be encrypted in units  
27 smaller than the block size, for example one 8-bit byte at a time. This cipher-  
28 feedback mode is described by Schneier, *ibid*, at pages 200-203.

29 In yet another embodiment, if encryption is used, all bitstreams must be  
30 loaded starting at address 0. One implementation of this embodiment replaces

1 any address loaded into the starting frame address register FAR (Fig. 6) with  
2 address 0 when an op code specifying encryption is received.

3 In still another embodiment, the starting address and the design data are  
4 both encrypted. In this embodiment, it is possible to load several segments of  
5 encrypted design data starting at different frame addresses, just as is possible with  
6 unencrypted design data.

7 In another embodiment, the key data stored in a key memory such as key  
8 memory 23 specifies the number of keys that will follow. In a variation on this  
9 embodiment, the key data also specify the number of keys that precede the key. If  
10 an attacker gives a key address other than the first key address intended by the  
11 designer, the configuration may be aborted. Additionally, encryption will proceed  
12 until the number of keys specified within the keys have been used.

13 In another embodiment, instead of allowing keys to be read back when the  
14 key memory is in a non-secure mode, the keys include parity bits or CRC check  
15 bits, and only these bits can be read back for verification that the key or keys were  
16 loaded correctly. This embodiment allows keys known to one designer to be kept  
17 secret from another designer, and is useful when the PLD is to be used at different  
18 times for loading different designs.

19 Regarding the CRC checksum calculation discussed above, embodiments can  
20 be provided in which the CRC checksum is calculated either before or after a  
21 design is encrypted. Of course, if the checksum added to the bitstream is  
22 calculated before the design data is encrypted, then a corresponding checksum  
23 must be calculated within the PLD on the design data after it has been decrypted.  
24 Likewise, if the checksum added to the bitstream is calculated after the design  
25 data has been encrypted, then the PLD must calculate the corresponding  
26 checksum on the received bitstream before the design data have been decrypted.

27 A further note regarding the process of loading the decryption keys, when  
28 the process illustrated in Fig. 8 is used, it is not necessary to use a device  
29 programmer for loading decryption keys. The keys may simply be loaded as part  
30 of the board test procedure.

1       It is also possible to use the structures and methods described above for  
2 programming more than one PLD. It is well known to use a single bitstream for  
3 programming more than one PLD or FPGA, either by arranging several devices in  
4 a daisy chain and passing the bitstream through the devices in series or  
5 addressing the devices in series. It is possible to arrange several PLDs in such an  
6 arrangement when one or more of the devices is to receive encrypted design data.

7       As yet another embodiment, although one embodiment was described in  
8 which only a single address could be specified for a bitstream having encrypted  
9 design data, in another embodiment, several addresses, preferably encrypted, can  
10 be specified for loading separate portions of a design. Further, these separate  
11 portions may use the same encryption key or keys, or the separate portions may  
12 use different encryption keys or different sets of keys.

13       Variations that have become obvious from the above description are  
14 intended to be included in the scope of the invention.